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1.  Introduction 
 
Prof. Alan Manne and Dr. Richard Richels have made many valuable contributions in modelling the 
economic costs of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions, and this paper (Manne and Richels, 1999) is one 
of these contributions. It first examines a “Kyoto Forever” scenario in which the Kyoto constraints on 
Annex I countries are maintained throughout the 21st century. Next, the paper calculates what the 
economic implications of limiting the purchase of carbon emission rights are. It shows that in case Annex I 
buyers are allowed to meet only one-third of their obligation through trading of carbon rights, the annual 
GDP losses in 2010 in the US are two and one-half to three times the case in which full global trading is 
assumed. Then, the paper examines the potential of carbon leakage through international fuel markets and 
through the migration of energy-intensive industries from Annex I countries to non-Annex I countries. 
Finally, the paper evaluates the Kyoto Protocol in the context of the longer-term goal of the Framework 
Convention.  
 
Reading this very interesting paper suggests four issues or questions to me. The first issue is about 
distributional realities of the international climate change negotiations. The second issue is about 
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correspondence between geopolitical regional aggregates in MERGE and Annex B countries. The third 
issue is about implications of the autonomous energy efficiency improvement rates assumed in MERGE on 
the income elasticity of energy consumption. And fourth issue is about market power in an international 
greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme. 
 
2.  Modelling distributional realities of the international climate change negotiations 
First of all, I agree with the broad conclusion of the paper (Manne and Richels, 1999) that a long-term 
climate strategy should be designed to facilitate achieving the Framework  Convention’s ultimate objective 
of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at the lowest possible abatement and 
transaction costs. One might wonder why keeping down the costs of compliance matters. It is often heard 
that the high cost of compliance is just what polluters should suffer so that polluters are taught a lesson. 
From a political perspective, the more costly the compliance, the less likely it is that those who bear the high 
costs will be willing to commit to stringent emissions targets in the future. Given the fact that no emissions 
targets beyond 2012 have been set, increasing the overall costs of compliance thus makes it even more 
difficult to set stringent emissions targets for some Annex B countries, if not all, for the subsequent 
commitment periods beyond 2012 in order to achieve the Climate Convention’s ultimate objective.2 It is the 
lack of the targets of post-2012 that is seen as a threat to the pace of technical innovation needed to make 
more stringent future emissions targets affordable. The lack of such long-term commitments also restricts 
the choice of the compliance mechanisms and tools and creates some divergence of views in assigning 
liability in an international greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme (Zhang, forthcoming). 
 
There are many paths to a longer-term stabilization concentration target. The path of offering great when 
flexibility, namely, the path that would begin gradually and leave the more drastic cuts in emissions in later 
periods, receives increased attention in the literature on economic and environmental implications of 
reaching a specific atmospheric concentration target (see, for example, Richels and Edmonds, 1995; 
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Wigley, Richels and Edmonds, 1996; Manne and Richels, 1998; Yang and Jacoby, 1999). However, as 
Jacoby et al. point out, although these studies are instructive, their emphasis on global cost-effectiveness 
tends to underplay important distributional realities of the international climate change negotiations, and 
how they might be worked out over time. With the successful conclusion of the Montreal Protocol that sets 
percentage reduction targets for CFC emissions, it is not surprising that calls for limiting greenhouse gas 
emissions have focused on a similar strategy since the June 1988 Toronto Conference, which has 
recommended a 20% reduction by 2005 and a 50% reduction by 2025 in global CO2 emissions relative to 
the 1988 levels (Zhang, 1997). Although it is the accumulated concentration of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere, not the annual emissions, that influences climate change, as at Kyoto, negotiations will 
continue to be about emissions levels in the near term, not about emission trajectories over several decades. 
In my review, the main reason is that, in the absence of dramatic and forceful changes from the business-
as-usual trends, negotiators, particularly from developing countries, believe that private firms and 
consumers alike will not change their production and consumption patterns and will not take seriously the 
need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.3 The question then arises: how can one connect negotiations 
about near-term emissions reductions with a long-term stabilization objective? With the belief that in any 
fair regime substantial differences in per capita income will translate into substantial differences in 
emissions control obligations, Jacoby et al. (1999), for example, propose that accession of developing 
countries and burden sharing should be based on ability of pay. Although it is not my intention to 
recommend the approach as the sole determinant of incremental emissions control obligations, it might be 
worthwhile pursuing this kind of thought in assuming national commitments in MERGE towards the 
lowest cost path to the longer-term stabilization concentration target. This would enrich the policy 
relevance of this study to the ongoing climate change negotiations. 
 
3.  Correspondence between geopolitical regional aggregates in MERGE and Annex B countries 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to achieve greater reductions in SO2 emissions than would otherwise be possible. I believe that the arguments 
also hold for setting the post-2012 greenhouse gas emissions targets. 
3 Negotiating the appropriate size and shape of percentage emissions reductions would be not that easy. On 
the one hand, whatever a target is agreed on should be large enough to signal a decisive change from the 
business-as-usual trends. On the other hand, it should not be so large that governments would dismiss it as 
unrealistic. 
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It is unclear whether the correspondence between geopolitical regional aggregates in MERGE and Annex 
B countries is exact. It seems to me that Annex B countries modelled in MERGE constitute all the OECD 
countries and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (EEFSU). As such, they include Turkey as an 
OECD country and the Central Asian Republics as part of the EEFSU.  But Turkey and the Central Asian 
Republics are not Annex B parties to the Kyoto Protocol. Although such a distinction does not have a 
fundamental impact on the results of the paper, from a climate change negotiator perspective it would be 
very useful to separate these non-Annex B countries from the Annex B parties aggregates in MERGE. 
 
4.  Implications of the choice of autonomous energy efficiency improvement rates on the income 
elasticity of energy consumption 
One of the possibilities of decoupling energy consumption and CO2 emissions from GDP growth in 
integrated assessment models, such as MERGE, is represented by the autonomous energy efficiency 
improvement (AEEI) parameter. The parameter accounts for all but energy price-induced energy 
conservation. Energy conservation of this type is available at zero or negative net cost, and is taking place 
regardless of the development of energy prices. It may be brought out by regulations. It may also occur as a 
result of “good housekeeping” or of a shift in the economic structure away from energy-intensive heavy 
manufacturing towards services. In the case where the parameter lowers the rate of growth of CO2 
emissions over time and therefore decreases the amount by which CO2 emissions need to be constrained, the 
economic impacts of a given carbon constraint will also be lower. 
 
In MERGE, the AEEI value is taken to be 40% of the rate of GDP growth. This implies that energy 
consumption grows at 60% of the rate of GDP growth. If price-induced energy conservation is taken into 
account, then energy consumption grows at a rate even lower than 60% of the rate of GDP growth. This 
leads to an income elasticity of energy consumption of less than 0.6. Comparing the implicitly assumed 
elasticity with what has been derived from the World Bank (1996), as given in Table 1, we can see that the 
assumed elasticities are backed from conventional wisdom for the OECD countries and China, but are 
much lower than what were observed for low-income economie and upper-middle-income economies over 
the period 1980-1994, which include four geopolitical regions modelled in MERGE, such as, Eastern 
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Europe and the Former Soviet Union (EEFSU), India, Mexico and OPEC (MOPEC), and the rest of world 
(ROW). Given the implications of the assumed AEEI values, and the fact that the AEEI values have a 
crucial influence on the estimates of economic costs of a given carbon constraint, what AEEI values are 
considered reasonable for the countries and regions considered in MERGE are worthy of further 
investigation.  
 
Table 1  Growth Rates of GDP and Energy Consumption, and the Income Elasticity of Energy 
Consumption among Different Economies, 1980-1994 
 
 Annual growth 
of GDP (%) 
Annual growth of 
energy consumption (%) 
Income elasticity of 
energy consumption 
Low-income economies * 
    China 
    India 
Upper-middle-income economies 
High-income economies 
2.5 
11.0 
5.2 
2.5 
2.8 
3.3 
4.5 
6.3 
3.9 
1.1 
1.32 
0.41 
1.21 
1.56 
0.39 
 
* Excluding China and India. 
Source: Calculated based on data from the World Bank (1996). 
 
5. The issue of market power in an international greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme 
The paper investigates the impact of market power. It indicates that the international price of permits 
depends on who resides in market power. With a buyer’s market, buyers exert sufficient market power to 
hold the international price to the marginal cost of abatement in the selling countries. As such, the 
international price of permits is much lower than those in the absence of market power. Conversely, when 
market power resides with the sellers, the international price of permits is much higher than those in the 
absence of market power. This would lead to high economic losses for the buying countries, such as the 
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US. This raises an important question: is market power a real issue in an international greenhouse gas 
emissions trading? 
 
In my view, monopoly power in permits market eventually depends on how an international greenhouse 
gas emissions trading scheme will take shape. Emissions trading modelled in MERGE operates as if 
governments retain the sole right to trade. As such, emissions trading takes place on a government-to-
government basis. Under this trading model, there are few players on the market. So market power could 
likely be an issue, particularly when the majority of inexpensive emissions permits are concentrated among 
a few Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union countries. 
 
If Annex B governments elect to allocate the assigned amounts to individual sub-national entities, and 
authorize them to trade on the international emissions permits market, any effectuated trades take place on a 
source- to-source basis (See Zhang (1998, forthcoming) for a detailed discussion on inter-governmental 
emissions trading and inter-source trading). Incorporating sub-national entities into an international emissions 
trading scheme would potentially increase the total amount of transactions in the international scheme. 
Increasing the number of trades would help to improve market liquidity and reduce the potential for abuse of 
market power. Hargrave (1998) shows that if an upstream trading system, which targets fossil fuel 
producers and importers as regulated entities,4 would be implemented in the US, the total number of 
allowance holders would be restricted to about 1900, as shown in Table 2. Even with such a relatively 
small number of regulated sources, market power would not be an issue. In the above upstream system for 
the US, the largest firm has only a 5.6 percent market allowance share. Firms, with each having less than 
one percent share, would hold the lion’s share of allowances  (Cramton and Kerr, 1998). Even if market 
power would not be an issue under the domestic emissions trading scheme, it is hard to imagine a market 
power problem, if trading is broadened beyond the national boundary and provided that requisite 
international institutions supporting trading are available. So, in my review, the results as estimated by 
                                                          
4 In contrast, a downstream trading system would be applied at the point of emissions. As such, a large 
number of diverse energy users are included. See Zhang (1998, forthcoming) for a detailed discussion on 
upstream, downstream and hybrid emissions trading systems. 
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MERGE under the assumption of market power should be regarded as an upper bound on the price of 
carbon permits and the GDP losses. 
 
Table 2 Number of Regulated Entities in an Upstream Trading System in the US 
 
Industry Point of regulation Number of regulated entities 
Oil 
Oil 
Natural gas 
Natural gas liquids 
Coal 
Coal 
Refinery 
Refined product importers 
Pipeline 
Processing plant 
Preparation plant 
Mine 
175 
200 
150 
725 
550 
100* 
Total  1900 
 
* Although there are approximately 2100 mines in the US, the number of mines actually required to hold 
allowance probably would be less than 100. This is because mines would be required to hold allowances 
only for coal not sent to preparation plants. This occurs at a relatively small number of mines, principally 
located in the West. 
Source: Hargrave (1998). 
 
However, collusive behaviour might occur under the CDM, because both host and investor governments 
do play the role in approving CDM projects, whereas, under inter-source trading, the governments are 
limited to setting the rules rather than undertaking emissions trading themselves. This raises the question 
that how developing countries can limit the supply of CDM credits and maximize the revenues of selling 
CDM credits. Figure 1 shows an aggregated downward-sloping demand curve of Annex I countries and an 
aggregated upward-sloping supply curve of non-Annex I countries to supply the total quantity of CDM 
credits at various price levels (for simplicity, I draw linear demand and supply curves here). The point Eo 
 7
where the two curves labelled as Demand and Supplyo cross gives the market cleaning price of CDM 
credits Po and the total quantity of CDM credits traded Qo. The area OEoPo represents the net gain to non-
Annex I countries. Then, how to increase the net gain to non-Annex I countries? As shown in Figure 1, this 
could be achieved  by shifting supply curve upward from Supplyo  to Supply*. At the new equilibrium E* 
where the new supply curve Supply* crosses the same demand curve Demand, although the total quantity 
of CDM credits traded drops to Q*, the net gain OE*P* is greater than OEoPo  because the market clearing 
price P* rises faster than the quantity falls. This has a very important policy implication, as it suggests that 
if the market clearing price could be held up to the reasonable level, relatively costly CDM projects could 
be undertaken early with international partners. This would leave low-cost abatement options (the so-called 
low-hanging fruits) available for later use of their own if developing countries would be subsequently 
required to reduce their own emissions. 
 
The question then arises: how can the market price of CDM credits could be raised? One tacit collusive 
strategy is that developing countries could insist on restriction on the use of flexibility mechanisms to meet 
Annex I countries’ Kyoto commitments in the name of promoting technical innovation needed to make 
more stringent future emissions targets affordable and thus kick off the ball to Annex I countries’ court. 
Another way is to prevent trading in hot air, although in practice it is very difficult to distinguish real 
reduction from hot air.5 Because hot air is available at zero abatement cost, allowing hot air to be traded 
tends to push down the overall market clearing price because it reduces Annex I countries’ demand for 
CDM credits. It has dawned on many developing countries and environmental NGOs that the US is 
counting on breathing Russian hot air to comply with its reduction target set in the Kyoto Protocol, rather 
than taking abatement actions at home. In this regard, it would be very helpful to clear up the doubt about 
this, if MERGE could provide the estimated amount of hot air and estimate the economic implications of 
excluding trading in hot air on the US economy.  
 
                                                          
5 When emissions trading were allowed, a country whose legally binding greenhouse gas emissions limits 
set by the Kyoto Protocol exceed its actual or anticipated emissions requirements would be able to trade 
these excess emissions, thus creating the hot air that would otherwise have not occurred. The hot air 
problem would be particularly acute in Russia whose emissions are not expected to rise to its 1990 level 
until 2010 (UNFCCC, 1997).  
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Figure 1  Aggregated Demand and Supply Curves of CDM Credits 
 
References 
Cramton, P. and S. Kerr (1998), Tradeable Carbon Allowance Auctions: How and Why to Auction, 
University of Maryland at College Park. 
Hargrave, T. (1998), US Carbon Emissions Trading: Description of an Upstream Approach, Center for 
Clear Air Policy, Washington, DC. 
Jacoby, H.D., Schmalensee, R. and I.S. Wing (1999), Toward a Useful Architecture for Climate Change 
Negotiations, MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report No. 49, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Manne, A. and R. Richels (1997), On Stabilizing CO2 Concentrations: Cost-Effective Emission Reduction 
Strategies, Environmental Modeling and Assessment, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 251-265. 
 9
 10
Manne, A. and R. Richels (1999), The Kyoto Protocol: A Cost-Effective Strategy for Meeting Environmental 
Objective?, Presented at the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group III Expert 
Meeting on the Economic Impacts of Annex I Mitigation Policies on Non-Annex I Countries, The 
Hague, 27-28 May. 
Richels, R. and J. Edmonds (1995), The Economics of Stabilizing atmospheric CO2 Concentrations, Energy 
Policy, Vol. 23, Nos. 4/5, pp. 373-378. 
Stavins, R.N. (1998), What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance 
Trading, Journal of Economic Perspective, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 69-88. 
UNFCCC (1997), Summary of the Report of the In-Depth Review of the National Communication of Russian 
Federation, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
FCCC/IDR.1(SUM)/RUS, Bonn. 
Wigley, T.M.L., Richels, R. and J.A. Edmonds (1996), Economic and Environmental Choices in the 
Stabilization of atmospheric CO2 Concentrations, Nature, Vol. 379, No. 6562, pp. 240-243. 
World Bank (1996), World Development Report 1996, Oxford University Press, New York. 
Yang, Z. and  H.D. Jacoby (1999), Necessary Conditions for Stabilization Agreements, in C. Carraro (ed.), 
International Environments on climate Change, Kluwer, Dordrecht. 
Zhang, Z.X. (1997), The Economics of Energy Policy in China: Implications for Global Climate Change, 
New Horizons in Environmental Economics Series, Edward Elgar, England. 
Zhang, Z.X. (1998), Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading and the World Trading Systems, Journal of World 
Trade, Vol. 32, No. 5, pp. 219-239. 
Zhang, Z.X. (forthcoming), The Design and Implementation of an International Scheme for Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy. 
